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Abstract
In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents
may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a po-
tential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between
humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We de-
velop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only
three players and competition takes place only within two stages.
Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents
and the knowledge is modelled as inuencing their marginal cost
of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards
knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual com-
petition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game
may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be-
cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player
of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of
winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer"
may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker
player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his
probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probabil-
ity of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second
stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker
player rather than the stronger one.
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JEL classication: C72, D83
I am deeply indebted to Carmen Beviá, Matthias Dahm, Bernardo Moreno and
Enriqueta Aragones for their valuable comments and suggestions. I also want to
thank Generalitat de Catalunya for nancial support.
yCorrespondence: Economic Studies, University of Dundee, 3 Perth Road, Dundee
DD1 4HN, UK; Tel: (+44) (0) 1382 384372; Fax: (+44) (0) 1382 384691; Email:
a.kwiatkowski@dundee.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
The problem of transmission of knowledge (or know-how)1 between hu-
mans involved in some kind of interaction is a point of concern of many
economists. This is an important issue for instance in personnel eco-
nomics theory. The problem is of particular interest when the interac-
tion admits a form of competition. This is so because knowledge sharing
in competitive situations is very di¢ cult, as it can be interpreted as
a type of cooperative behavior, which is in opposition to competition.
The conventional wisdom suggests that in such environments the disclo-
sure enhances the likely performance of opponents in the actual contest,
and thereby reduces ones own chances of winning it. As a result, non-
cooperatively behaving humans acting as the agents of competition do
not want to reveal any knowledge. The economic literature hasnt pro-
vided so far examples of mechanisms that could create any incentives to
disclose knowledge in such situations. Therefore, in this paper we focus
on the knowledge-sharing behavior of people, who act as agents of com-
petitive interaction. Our main objective is to bridge the existing gap in
the economic theory on knowledge sharing between humans. We want to
shed some more light on this particular case of competitive interactions
and address the question about possible situations where knowledge ex-
change between non-cooperatively behaving humans may emerge as an
equilibrium solution.
Industrial-organization theory predicts that there are some circum-
stances in which competing agents have incentives to share their private
knowledge with rivals2. The disclosure of know-how emerges there ei-
ther by imposing cooperative behavior of rms in the stage preceding
the actual competition where knowledge sharing decision is taken or, if
1In this paper knowledge is understood as facts or ideas of di¤erent quality ac-
quired by study, investigation, observation, or experience, which are used by a player
to perform e¢ ciently, that is at lower levels of cost of e¤ort. It can be therefore
interpreted as know-how that a player possesses and potentially can exchange with
other players.
2There knowledge (know-how) sharing between competitors takes the form of
sharing of technology and the actual competition is to discover an innovation rst, or
in the market of a product. For instance, the know-how disclosure may be observed if
we impose cooperative behavior of rms in the stage preceding the actual competition
where knowledge sharing decision is taken. It may also emerge as a result of the
increase in the present value of future prots of a rm that lost in a patent race.
This increase happens because the rm may be able to benet from the invention
by imitating it, from using it after the patent expires and the invention still has
a considerable commercial value, or from using it to obtain its own invention in a
related eld. The disclosure of know-how may be also observed when rms operate
in di¤erent but complementary industries and in models that deal with licensing of
the disclosed knowledge, or in models where R&D costs are already sunk.
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cooperative behavior is not assumed, when sharing of knowledge with a
rival has a potential positive e¤ect for ones payo¤. Unfortunately, the
mechanisms that lead to knowledge sharing in this part of the economic
literature are very often the result of some peculiar characteristics of
industrial organization that simply cannot be applied in the interactions
between human beings. In this paper we study a model where agents
may exchange knowledge without resorting to any of the explanations
quoted above: in our model agents always behave non-cooperatively,
information is complete and there are no mechanisms that change the
value of the prize for the winner. As a potential factor that could induce
the disclosure of knowledge between humans we consider the timing of
the moves of players. To concentrate only on incentives to share knowl-
edge, we develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are
only three players and competition takes place only within two stages.
In the rst stage, two of three agents compete against each other and the
winner goes to the second stage of the game. Here he competes with the
third agent, who in the previous stage was not active (the "observer")3.
The winner of the second stage gets the prize. Additionally, before the
whole game starts, all agents decide to pass or not some of their private
knowledge to each of their opponents, which a¤ects their cost functions
that they use in subsequent stages. Such a decision is taken again at the
end of the rst stage of a game by a survivor of that stage and the agent
who was not active in that stage.
An interesting feature of our model is that players can share their
private knowledge with their opponents. To win a contest a player exerts
e¤ort and the knowledge is modelled as inuencing its marginal cost.
This is done in such a way that more knowledge is associated with lower
levels of this cost. Decision to pass knowledge to opponents is done
twice: before the actual competition in the rst stage of a game and at
the end of that stage, when its winner is already determined. Players
while making this decision need to consider all possible e¤ects that may
follow. The knowledge transfer doesnt generate any directs costs, but,
as our analysis shows, there are other, strategic consequences of this
3Therefore our model reects such competitive situations in which one of the
game participants can be an "observer" of competition of his potential rivals. This
may happen for instance if he is perceived to be "the leader" of another, parallel
competition, which he wins with certainty or almost with certainty. It may be also
someone, who is known to be a participant of the nal stage before the game starts,
because he is the winner of the parallel competition, which has already nished.
Similar examples cover such cases in which the "observer" is somebody who goes
directly to the nal stage of a game by game rules, which happens in some sports.
In some of them players with some level of maturity or skills, as assessed by their
history, go to the nals without having to participate in semi-nals of a game.
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decision, that may potentially lower the expected utility of a knowledge
donor.
One of our main results is that knowledge sharing can occur even
in purely non-cooperative environments. Namely, using our model we
identied two main sources of the knowledge-disclosure incentives that
may potentially appear in such cases. One such a mechanism is that
before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage
of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer",
because this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of
that stage. As a consequence, the e¤ort exerted by the weaker player
falls and so his probability of winning in a ght. We show that before the
actual competition starts there is also another source of the knowledge-
sharing incentives. Namely the "observer" may have sometimes desire to
share knowledge with one of the two remaining players to enforce him in
a ght. This happens when the di¤erence in the marginal cost of e¤ort
between the weaker and the stronger player of the rst stage of a game
is high enough. In such a situation the "observer" may gain in expected
terms by sharing knowledge to some extent with the weaker player of the
rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning
in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger
player. Through this mechanism, in the second stage the "observer"
may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the
stronger one.
The lines of research that can be identied as related to our pa-
per cover many areas of the economic theory. This paper is related to
some works in the industrial organization literature, which concentrate
on incentives that competing rms have to share their strategic knowl-
edge on technology. In this area of research Poyago-Theotoky (1999)
shows that cooperating (non-cooperating) rms choose maximal (min-
imal) disclosure levels (spillovers). De Fraja (1993) shows that if for
whatever reason, a rivals success increases a rms own prot, the latter
could, by disclosing some of its knowledge, reduce the overall expected
cost of the patent race, while reducing also the expected benet. Kat-
soulacos and Ulph (1998) show that rms operating in di¤erent but
complementary industries may choose to maximally reveal knowledge,
even in the absence of cooperation. Bhattacharya, Glazer and Sapping-
ton (1990) derive conditions under which full sharing of knowledge can
be motivated in R&D joint ventures. Atallah (2003) studies R&D joint
ventures in terms of information sharing and the stability of coopera-
tion. dAspremont, Bhattacharya and Gérard-Varet (2000) consider the
problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge
between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate, patentable
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invention. Kovenocky, Morathz and Münster (2009) study incentives to
share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with pro-
motional competition, procurement contests, or R&D, when rms have
independent values or common values of winning a contest. The issue of
know-how sharing appears also in models that deal with licensing of the
disclosed knowledge, as in Bhattacharya, Glazer and Sappington (1992),
or in models where R&D costs are already sunk, as in Kultti and Takalo
(1998). Our paper is also related to ones in other areas of economics,
where the interaction between the agent who reveals the knowledge and
others doesnt necessarily take the form of competition, but the issue
of knowledge sharing is vital. This is so, for instance, in the literature
on the principal-agent relationship, where a common problem is how
much of knowledge the principal should pass to his employees. Reveal-
ing the knowledge makes an agent more productive, but also can cause
the agent to become self-employed. This issue is investigated for in-
stance in Kräkel (2002), Kräkel (2005), Pakes and Nitzan (1983), and in
Barcena-Ruiz and Rubio (2000). Our model can be interpreted as a very
simple two-stage version of an elimination contest. Therefore our work
is also related to papers on such a type of competition. A paper that is
the most closely related to ours in this eld of the economic research is
Amegashie and Runkel (2007), who study a two-stage elimination con-
test with sabotaging. Sabotaging appears there in the form of help to a
weaker player to decrease winning chances of a stronger player (indirect
sabotage). This is very similar to what we observe in our model, where
any potential knowledge sharing can be interpreted as a form of such
sabotaging help. However, there exist fundamental di¤erence between
the work of Amegashie and Runkel (2007) and ours. In their paper the
relative performance of a player who received help is enhanced only in
the stage of a game in which the sabotaging activity is performed. In
our work, however, the e¤ect of knowledge sharing (help) enhances the
relative performance of a help receiver throughout the whole game in
any potential ght and at any of its stages. Other works, in which elim-
ination contests are studied, are for instance Amegashie (2004), Zhang
(2008), Zhang and Wang (2009).
Although our model could nd application in many particular situ-
ations, it is motivated mainly by competition between humans, such as
in sports, in a workplace or even in some kind of TV shows (games). In
many such cases we can view the competition as a multistage process in
which only a winner of a stage proceeds with the game, and the loser
drops out. As an example consider sports, where rivals are initially di-
vided into groups within which they compete, and the group winners go
to the next stage where they compete again. In this example knowledge
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sharing could potentially appear between players in di¤erent groups,
such that a player in one group by disclosing some of his knowledge
helps to a weaker player in other group to increase his chances to win
and eliminate a stronger player(s). Note that this disclosed knowledge
may be used by the weaker player not only to win the stage of a game
just after the knowledge is disclosed to him but also during later stages
of the competition. As a multistage game we can also view competition
in a workplace, where some group of workers, for instance in one de-
partment, compete and the best among them is promoted to a post at
a higher level. At this new level he competes again with another worker
or workers. Here again, knowledge sharing could potentially appear be-
tween workers in di¤erent departments, such that a worker in one of
them by disclosing some of his knowledge may help to a weaker member
in other department to increase his chances to be promoted and elimi-
nate in this way other, stronger rival(s). As in the previous example, the
knowledge acquired by that weaker worker may be used by him just after
it is disclosed but also later in subsequent stages of the competition.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce our
model. In Section 3 we perform the analysis of di¤erent incentives to
share knowledge between competitors. Section 4 concludes. For the
clarity of presentation all our proofs are delegated to Appendix.
2 The model
Let N = f1; 2; 3g denote the set of risk-neutral individuals who compete
against each other in a contest game. The contest is organized in the
following way: It consists of three stages S = f0; 1; 2g. In stage 1 two
of three agents compete against each other and the winner goes to the
second part of the game  stage 2. Here he competes with the third
agent, who in stage 1 was not active. The winner of stage 2 gets the
prize. Before the whole game starts, in stage 0 all agents decide to pass
or not some of their private knowledge to each of their opponents. Such
a decision is taken again at the end of stage 1 by a survivor of stage 1
and the agent who was passive in that stage. Without loss of generality
we assume that agents 1 and 2 participate in stage 1 of the game. The
winner of this part goes to stage 2 and competes here with agent 3.
Let Ns denote the subset of N of individuals who compete against each
other in a stage s of the contest game. It follows that in each stage, 1
and 2, only two contestants i; j 2 Ns; i 6= j compete against each other,
with N1 = f1; 2g, and N2 = f1; 3g or N2 = f2; 3g depending on the
result of the competition in stage 1. As all agents participate in stage 0,
N0 = N = f1; 2; 3g. To win the contest, in a stage s = 1; 2 a contestant i
2 Ns exerts an e¤ort level eis 2 R+, while his opponent a contestant j
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exerts an e¤ort level ejs 2 R+. It is assumed that all contestants have
the same positive valuation V for the contested prize. The contestants
di¤er in the respective "cost function" that captures the disutility of
exerting e¤ort eis. It is assumed that for all i 2 N and for all s = 1; 2
this cost function is linear in eis and multiplicative in is, such that:
cis (eis) = iseis; (1)
where is > 0 is a marginal cost parameter of an agent i in a stage
s. By assumption, marginal cost of e¤ort is nite and constant, and
the knowledge level is related to it in such a way that a player with a
higher knowledge level has lower marginal cost of e¤ort. Formally, given
a marginal cost of e¤ort is, the level of the knowledge of an agent i, is
dened as
is =
1
is
: (2)
At the beginning of a game an agent i has initial marginal cost of e¤ort
i0 > 0, and consequently the knowledge level
i0 =
1
i0
: (3)
The knowledge levels of players in a stage s can be ordered in the fol-
lowing sense: if players i and j have knowledge levels is and js, re-
spectively, with is > js, only a player j can gain from an exchange of
knowledge. At best, his knowledge level can be raised to is. Any knowl-
edge transmission always benets a knowledge receiver and never harms
in terms of his knowledge level. Although other information structures
are conceivable4, the ordering we adopt seems natural in the cases that
we want to consider in our model. In stage 0 of a game all agents, and
at the end of stage 1 a survivor of stage 1 and the agent who was
passive in that stage, decide about their levels of knowledge disclosure
to an opponent. We assume that while making this knowledge-sharing
decision agents behave in a non-cooperative way. Let sij be a parameter
which reects how much knowledge is disclosed by an agent i to an agent
j in a stage s. Considering the way in which knowledge is transmitted
in our model 
sij 2 [0; is   js]; if is > js,
sij = 0; otherwise.
(4)
4For instance that pieces of knowledge of di¤erent players are treated as comple-
mentary goods. In such a case, both players could benet from exchange of knowledge
and their knowledge levels could be potentially raised even to i0+ j0 for both of
them.
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Given sij for all i 2 N; i 6= j, in a stage s + 1 the knowledge level of a
player j becomes

j(s+1)
= js + max
i2N;i6=j

sij
	
; (5)
where the "max" operator reects the fact that his di¤erent opponents
may decide to pass him di¤erent amounts of their knowledge. In such a
case we assume that the knowledge of a player j increases by the highest
piece of knowledge that his opponents pass to him, max
i2N;i6=j

sij
	
. With
the change in the knowledge level of a player j, his marginal cost of e¤ort
also changes accordingly and becomes:
j(s+1) =
1
j(s+1)
: (6)
We assume that the contestants 1 and 2 are heterogenous in terms
of their marginal cost parameter ex ante i0 and are ordered, such that
10 < 20, with normalization 10 = 1. The marginal cost parameter ex
ante of a contestant 3 is not restricted in this sense and may be below or
above 10. However, as we assumed earlier, it is always strictly positive.
The contestants perceive the outcome of the each stage of the contest
game as probabilistic. However, they can inuence the probability of
winning by exerting e¤ort, which means that the outcome depends on
the vector of e¤ort levels exerted by both individuals playing in a stage.
In our model we will employ the following Contest Success Function
(CSF) pi : R2+ ! [0; 1]:
pi(eis; ejs) =
eis
eis + ejs
; for all i 2 Ns; s = 1; 2. (7)
This function maps the vector of e¤ort levels (eis; ejs) into win probabil-
ities for each contestant. It is a restricted version of a CSF axiomatized
in Skaperdas (1996)5. If no contestant exerts positive e¤ort it is assumed
5In Skaperdas (1996) a CSF has an exponential form pi(ei; ej) =
eri
eri+e
r
j
=
eri
eri+e
r
j
,
for all i 2 N , with  > 0 and r > 0. The parameter r measures the sensitivity of
the outcome of the contest game with respect to di¤erences in e¤ort. To simplify our
analysis and to focus only on the e¤ects of knowledge exchange it is assumed that the
CSF is linear with r = 1. Also with a general parameter r > 0 the existence of pure
strategy equilibria cannot be guaranteed (see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994)
for details). With the restriction r = 1 all our equilibria are in pure strategies.
Apart from the exponential CSF, Skaperdas (1996) axiomatized also the logit CSF:
pi(ei; ej) =
ekei
ekei+ekej
, for all i 2 N , with k > 0. The parameter k, similar to the
parameter r, measures the sensitivity of the outcome of the contest game with respect
to di¤erences in e¤ort.
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that none of the individuals receives the prize, i.e. pi(0; 0) = 0 for all i
2 N 6.
In each stage s = 1; 2 a contestant i 2 Ns aims at maximizing his
expected utility, which given the cost function (1) and the contest mech-
anism (7) takes the following (additive separable) form:
ui (eis; ejs) = pi(eis; ejs)is   cis (eis) ; (8)
where
is =

ui (ei2; e32) , if s = 1, for all i 2 N1;
V , if s = 2 for all i 2 N2 ; (9)
with (ei2; e32) denoting the e¤ort levels of a player i 2 N1 and of player
37 in stage 2, and
ui (ei2; e32)= pi(ei2; e32)i2   ci (ei2)
= pi(ei2; e32)V   ci (ei2)
denoting the expected payo¤of a player i in that stage. The denition of
is reects the fact that the payo¤s in stage 2 are the playersvaluations
in stage 1.
It is assumed that in every stage of a game 0, 1 and 2 players make
all their decisions simultaneously and behave in a non-cooperative way.
Our game is formulated under complete information and the equilibrium
concept that we use is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Players choose
their strategies: e¤ort levels and the knowledge disclose parameters sij
that maximize their expected utilities.
3 Analysis
We start by solving our model by backward induction for e¤ort levels of
players in stages 1 and 2.
Note rst that as N1 = f1; 2g, and N2 = f1; 3g or N2 = f2; 3g in
either stage we have only two agents i and j, i 6= j who compete against
each other. So, rst we solve our model in a general case, with agents
i and j, i; j 2 Ns; i 6= j being the competitors. Plugging the CSF and
the cost function as specied in equations (7) and (1) into the expected
utility function of an agent i in eq. (8) and di¤erentiating, produces the
following rst order condition:
ejs
(eis + ejs)
2is   is = 0, for all i 2 Ns;
6Another convention in the contest-game literature is that pi(0; 0) = 12 for all i 2
N . The choice of either denition is not important in terms of the results that we
obtain in this paper
7Note that in the denition we consider the fact that in stage 2 agent 3 always
participates in a game, having as his opponent either agent 1 or agent 2.
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which after some algebra produce the (sub)equilibrium e¤ort candidate
for i 2 Ns:
eis =
(is)
2jsjs
(jsis +isjs)
2 .
This e¤ort candidate is strictly positive, given our assumptions on the
parameters. The second order conditions can be expressed as
@2ui (eis; ejs)
@e2is
=   2ejs
(eis + ejs)
3is < 0;
which proves concavity8. Thus the maximum exists and is interior and
unique.
So it follows from our analysis, that in each stage s = 1; 2 there
exists a unique interior (sub)equilibrium, in which players exert e¤ort at
positive levels. Those equilibrium e¤ort levels are
eis =
(is)
2jsjs
(jsis +isjs)
2 ; for all i 2 Ns. (10)
Plugging this result into eq. (8) (together with the CSF and the cost
function as specied in equations (7) and (1)) produces the (sub)equilibrium
expected payo¤s in a stage s = 1; 2, that may be written as
ui
 
eis; e

js

=
(is)
3 2js
(jsis +isjs)
2 ; for all i 2 Ns. (11)
In turn, plugging the equilibrium e¤ort levels into eq. (7) yields the
(sub)equilibrium probabilities of success in a stage s = 1; 2 that may be
expressed as
pi(e

is; e

js) =
isjs
jsis +isjs
; for all i 2 Ns: (12)
3.1 Stage 2
Lets concentrate on stage 2 of the game. Depending on the result of the
competition in stage 1, in stage 2 agent 3 either competes with agent 1
or with agent 2, that is N2 = f1; 3g or N2 = f2; 3g.
In stage 2 by eq. (9) i2 = V for all i 2 N2. Plugging this
into eq. (10) and considering the act that now s = 2 produces the
(sub)equilibrium e¤ort levels of players in stage 2:
ei2 =
j2
(i2 + j2)
2V; for all i 2 N2; j 2 N2; i 6= j.
8Here, we implicitly assume that is which is dened in eq. (9) is strictly positive.
As V > 0 by assumption, this requires that i;1 > 0 for all i 2 N1. As our subsequent
analysis shows this is always satised in equilibrium.
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Plugging again i2 = V for all i 2 N2 into eq. (11) with s = 2 yields
the (sub)equilibrium expected payo¤s of players in stage 2, that may be
expressed as
ui
 
ei2; e

j2

=
2j2
(i2 + j2)
2V , for all i 2 N2; j 2 N2; i 6= j. (13)
In this section we will be interested in e¤ects of changes in values of the
marginal cost parameters. To consider this fact we may rewrite eq. (13)
as a function of the parameters i2:
ui (i2; j2) = ui
 
ei2; e

j2

, for all i 2 N2; j 2 N2; i 6= j. (14)
Recall that by denition of is given in eq. (9) i;1 = ui (ei2; e32) for
all i 2 N1, which using last expression implies that
i1 =
232
(i2 + 32)
2V , for all i 2 N1, (15)
which is always is strictly positive for all i 2 N1, given our assumptions
on the parameters of the model.
Using again the fact that i2 = V for all i 2 N2, and eq. (12),
we may write the (sub)equilibrium probabilities of success of players in
stage 2 as
pi(e

i2; e

j2) =
j2
i2 + j2
; for all i 2 N2; j 2 N2; i 6= j. (16)
At the end of stage 1 a survivor of stage 1 and the agent who was
passive in that stage, decide about their levels of knowledge disclosure
to an opponent. Our objective now is to analyze di¤erent incentives
that govern this knowledge disclosure behavior of agents. To meet this
objective, we need to study how the expected payo¤s at the beginning of
stage 2 react to changes in the knowledge levels of the players. However,
by eq. (2) there exists one to one correspondence between the knowledge
level and the marginal cost of e¤ort of a player. Hence, to study knowl-
edge disclosure and knowledge ows between the players it is enough to
look at the changes in their levels of the marginal cost of e¤ort and this
is su¢ cient to derive any conclusions about their respective knowledge
changes. We will use this fact to simplify our analysis.
We analyze the incentives of players of stage 2 of a game to disclose
knowledge at the end of stage 1 in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 If all participants of stage 2 of a game have already been
determined, then there exists no SPE in which they have incentives to
share information between themselves, that is
1ij = 
1
ji = 0 for all i; j 2 N2; i 6= j.
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It follows from Proposition 1 that when a set of participants of stage
2 of a game has already been determined, then those participants do not
want to exchange their knowledge between themselves. The intuition
behind this result is the following: Suppose that an agent i and an agent
j are those who are to ght in stage 2 of a game and that the knowledge
level of an agent i is not lower that the level of an agent j. In such a case
an agent j is not capable of passing his knowledge to an agent i, so he
doesnt do it, but an agent i has such possibility and may disclose some
of his knowledge to an agent j. However, making an agent j stronger
by disclosing some knowledge to him just before the ght in stage 2
only reduces the expected utility of an agent i. This is as a result of
the increase in the e¤ort level of an agent i and of lower probability of
his success. This is not desired by an agent i, therefore he discloses no
knowledge to an agent j.
This means that the knowledge levels determined by the players in
stage 0 of a game do not change later at the end of stage 1, and remain
constant until the end of a game:
Conclusion 1 The levels of the marginal cost of e¤ort of players remain
constant throughout stages 1 and 2 of a game, that is
i2 = i1 for all i 2 N2:
Note that Conclusion 1 allows us to express all our results for stage 1
and/or 2 of a game in terms of marginal cost parameters i1; i 2 N only.
We will use this fact in our subsequent analysis and solve our model in
terms of those marginal cost parameters only.
3.2 Stage 1
Lets concentrate on stage 1 of the game. In this stage agent 1 always
competes with agent 2, that is N1 = f1; 2g.
By eq. (9), the playersvaluations in this stage, i;1 for all i 2 N1,
are their equilibrium expected payo¤s in stage 2. Those are given in
eq. (15). Plugging those valuations into eq. (10), eq. (11) and eq.
(12) and considering Conclusion 1 produces for all i 2 N1; j 2 N1; i 6= j
respectively: the (sub)equilibrium e¤ort levels of the players in stage 1:
ei1 =
j1
2
31 (j1 + 31)
2 
i1 (i1 + 31)
2 + j1 (j1 + 31)
22V; (17)
their (sub)equilibrium expected payo¤s in stage 1:
ui
 
ei1; e

j1

=
(j131)
2 (j1 + 31)
4
(i1 + 31)
2  i1 (i1 + 31)2 + j1 (j1 + 31)22V (18)
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and their (sub)equilibrium probabilities of success in stage 1:
pi(e

i1; e

j1) =
j1 (j1 + 31)
2
i1 (i1 + 31)
2 + j1 (j1 + 31)
2 . (19)
3.3 Stage 0
Before the actual competition starts, in stage 0 all agents decide to pass
or not some of their private knowledge to each of their opponents. In
the following we are going to study di¤erent incentives that may lead
to knowledge sharing between agents in that stage, assuming that they
behave non-cooperatively. In this section we will be mainly interested in
e¤ects of changes in values of the marginal cost parameters. To consider
this fact we may rewrite eq. (18) and (19) as functions of the parameters
i1; i 2 N :
ui (i1; j1; 31)  ui
 
ei1; e

j1

for all i 2 N1; j 2 N1; i 6= j; (20)
and
pi (i1; j1; 31)  pi(ei1; ej1); for all i 2 N1; j 2 N1; i 6= j. (21)
The last two equations express for an agent i 2 N1 the (sub)equilibrium
expected payo¤in a game at the beginning of stage 1 and the (sub)equilibrium
probability of success in stage 1, given marginal cost parameters i1; i 2
N . Agent 3 by assumption doesnt participate actively in stage 1 of a
game. Therefore his payo¤ at the beginning of this stage is given as the
expected payo¤ of his payo¤s in stage 2
u3 (11; 21; 31) = p1(e

11; e

21)u3 (e

32; e

12) + p2(e

21; e

11)u3 (e

32; e

22) ;
which using equations: (13) and (19), and Conclusion 1 after some al-
gebra yields
u3 () =
1121
 
21 (11 + 31)
4 + 11 (21 + 31)
4
' ()
V , (22)
where
' () = (11 + 31)
2 (21 + 31)
2  11 (11 + 31)2 + 21 (21 + 31)2
and  = (11; 21; 31).
Note that by eq. (6), eq. (5) and eq. (3), the value of j1 depends on
its initial value j0, which can be (only) reduced if any of agents i would
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decide to pass in stage 0 some of his knowledge to an agent j, that is
when 0ij > 0 for some i 2 N; i 6= j. Our ultimate objective is to analyze
di¤erent incentives that govern such knowledge disclosure behavior of
agents. To meet this objective, we need to study how the expected
payo¤s at the beginning of stage 1 react to changes in the knowledge
levels of the players. As in the proof of Proposition 1, to simplify our
analysis we will use the fact that there exists one to one correspondence
between the knowledge level and the marginal cost of e¤ort of a player.
We will be studying how the expected payo¤s at the beginning of stage
1 react to changes in the knowledge levels of the players by investigating
the e¤ects of the changes in their levels of the marginal cost of e¤ort,
rather than changes in their knowledge levels directly.
Our analysis of the knowledge sharing incentives in stage 0 of a game
we begin by considering agents 1 and 2.
Proposition 2 There exists no SPE in which in stage 0 of a game agent
1 and/or agent 2 share their knowledge between themselves, that is
012 = 
0
21 = 0.
It follows from Proposition 2, that none of agents 1 and 2 has possi-
bility or any incentives to pass any piece of his knowledge to his opponent
in stage 0 of a game. Agent 2 simply cant do this, because his knowl-
edge level is lower than the one of agent 1. Agent 1 in turn might do
it, but sharing any knowledge with his opponent in this stage has only
a detrimental e¤ect the reduction in his expected utility level. This is
as a result of the decrease in his winning probability and of the increase
in his e¤ort level at the same time.
The result given in Proposition 2 has another important consequence.
Namely, it implies that any knowledge ow towards agent 1 and/or agent
2 in stage 0 of a game may have its origin only in agent 3, and nor in
agent 1 nor 2. We will use this observation in our subsequent analysis.
We are going to consider now sharing of knowledge in stage 0 of a
game by agent 3 with agent 1. We begin this part of our analysis by
stating the following lemma:
Lemma 1 As long as 11 < 21, there exists no SPE in which in stage
0 of a game agent 3 has incentives to share his knowledge with agent 1.
That is in such a case
031 = 0.
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As we assumed, contestants 1 and 2 are ordered with respect to their
ex ante marginal cost parameter i0, such that 10 < 20. This fact
together with the results given in Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 suggest
that agent 1 would not receive in equilibrium in stage 0 of a game any
piece of knowledge from any of his opponents agent 2 and 3. This would
imply that his equilibrium level of the marginal cost of e¤ort in stage 1 is
equal to its ex ante value, that is 11 = 10 = 1. However, for this to be
really the case we need to check what happens in a potential equilibrium
with the marginal cost parameter of agent 2. Still it might occur that
in stage 0 of a game agent 3 has incentives to share his knowledge with
agent 2, and moreover that his most preferred level of the marginal cost
parameter of agent 2 is such that the condition 11 < 21 wouldnt hold.
In such a case Lemma 1 couldnt be applied. Specically, we need to
show now that the agent 3s most preferred level of the marginal cost
parameter of agent 2 in stage 1, 032, is always greater than 11 = 01 = 1.
This is done in Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 If 11 = 10 = 1, then
(i) there exists a level of the marginal cost parameter of agent 2 in
stage 1, which is the most preferred by agent 3, 032,
(ii) and this level is always greater than 10 = 1.
Now, using Lemma 2 together with Proposition 2 and Lemma 1, we
may state the following result about sharing knowledge by agent 3 with
agent 1 in stage 0 of a game:
Proposition 3 If 11 = 10 = 1, then there exists no SPE in which
in stage 0 of a game agent 3 has incentives to share his knowledge with
agent 1, that is
031 = 0:
It follows from Proposition 3 that in stage 0 of a game agent 3 the
passive player in stage 1 of a game, never wants to make stronger agent
1 the stronger active player of that stage. The intuition behind this
result is the following: Agent 3 knows that his opponent in stage 2 of a
game will be either agent 1 or agent 2 and that agent 1 is stronger than
agent 2. Making agent 1 even stronger by disclosing knowledge to him
has two e¤ects for agent 3: rst, it increases the winning probability of
agent 1 in stage 1 and thus makes more probable that he will be an agent
3s competitor in stage 2, second it increases the winning probability of
agent 1 in stage 2: Both e¤ects are not desired by agent 3, therefore he
discloses no knowledge to agent 1.
15
The result given in Proposition 3 together with the ones in Propo-
sition 2 and Lemma 2 have an important consequence in term of the
relation between the levels of a marginal cost parameter of agents 1 and
2 in stage 1 in a potential equilibrium:
Proposition 4 If a knowledge sharing SPE exists, then always 11 <
21, with 

11 = 10 = 1.
It follows that the relation ex ante between the levels of the marginal
cost parameter of agents 1 and 2 the active players of stage 1 of a game,
will hold also in stage 1 in a potential equilibrium. Moreover, the level
of the marginal cost parameter of agent 1 the stronger active player
of that stage, is always constant and doesnt change in equilibrium in
stage 1.
Now, we are going to consider sharing of knowledge in stage 0 by
agent 3 with agent 2. Note that by Lemma 2, there exists the level of the
marginal cost parameter of agent 2 in stage 1, which is the most preferred
by agent 3, 032. This implies that there exits also the corresponding most
preferred knowledge level of agent 2, 032. The fact that this knowledge
level exists, however, doesnt automatically mean that in stage 0 there is
always knowledge disclosure of agent 3 to agent 2. First, it may happen
that this most preferred level is lower than the knowledge level ex ante of
agent 2. Note that in our model, any knowledge transmission (sij > 0) is
always benecial to a knowledge receiver, as it increases his knowledge
(and never reduces it). Therefore, in this case, in stage 0 of a game
agent 3 would prefer not to disclose any piece of his knowledge to agent
2. Second, by eq. (4) there would be no knowledge transmission from
agent 3 to agent 2, if the knowledge level ex ante of agent 3 is lower
than the level of knowledge ex ante of agent 2. In other cases, there is
the knowledge disclosure of agent 3 to agent 2. This occurs when the
knowledge level ex ante of agent 3 and his most preferred level of the
knowledge of agent 2 are both higher than the knowledge level ex ante
of agent 2. This all is summarized in Proposition 5:
Proposition 5 If there exists a knowledge sharing SPE, then in such
an equilibrium in stage 0 of a game agent 3 may have incentives to share
his knowledge with agent 2 and they are described by the following rule:
032 = 0; if (30  20) [ (032  20) ;
032 > 0; otherwise.
It follows from Proposition 5 that in a potential equilibrium agent 3
the passive player of stage 1 of a game, may have sometimes incentives
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to share his knowledge in stage 0 of a game with agent 2 the weaker
active player of that stage. To understand the mechanism that leads
to knowledge sharing in this case we need to consider possible e¤ects
that may play a role here. Note that passing a piece of knowledge in
stage 0 by agent 3 to agent 2 improves the probability of winning of
agent 2 in both stages, 1 and 2, of a game. In stage 2 of a game it
tends to lower the expected payo¤ of agent 3, because he would have
lower chances to win with agent 2 than before. However, the increase in
probability of winning in stage 1 of a game doesnt necessarily have to be
harmful for agent 3 in terms of his expected payo¤. In this stage there
are two potential rivals for agent 3, and of those two agent 3 prefers to
compete in stage 2 with the weaker one agent 2. In such a ght agent
3 has much higher chances to win and his expected payo¤ is higher as
compared to a ght with agent 1 the stronger player. So if agent 2 is
very weak it may be benecial for agent 3, by passing some knowledge to
that player in stage 0 of a game, to increase his chances to win in stage
1. In this way agent 3 could have higher probability of competing in
stage 2 with the weaker player than with the stronger one. As a result,
the expected payo¤ of agent 3 could increase, because his chances to
win with the weaker player are higher, as compared to the ght with
the stronger player. Hence it may happen that as a result of passing
knowledge in stage 0, the gains for agent 3 from increasing the winning
probability of the weaker player in stage 1 of a game outweigh the losses
from his higher probability of winning in stage 2. This creates incentives
for agent 3 to share knowledge with agent 2.
Note that by Proposition 2 in stage 0 of a game agent 1 has no
incentives to share knowledge with agent 2, which implies that the level
of the marginal cost of e¤ort of agent 2 can be a¤ected only by agent 3,
as dened in Proposition 5.
Now we are going to consider sharing of knowledge in stage 0 by
agent 2 with agent 3.
Proposition 6 There exists no SPE in which in stage 0 of a game agent
2 has incentives to share his knowledge with agent 3, that is
023 = 0.
It follows from Proposition 6 that in stage 0 of a game agent 2 the
weaker player in stage 1 of a game, never wants to make stronger agent 3
the passive player in that stage. The intuition behind this result is the
following: Passing a piece of knowledge by agent 2 to agent 3 makes the
latter one stronger than before, which results in lowering the valuations
i;1 in stage 1 of a game for both agents, 1 and 2 (see eq.(15)). This
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a¤ects the performance of those players in stage 1 of a game, by reducing
their e¤ort levels. However, this detrimental e¤ect for the performance
of agent 2 in stage 1 of a game is much stronger than for agent 1, as a
result of the di¤erence in their marginal cost of e¤ort. This e¤ect is not
desired by agent 2, therefore he discloses no knowledge to agent 3.
Now we are going to consider sharing of knowledge by agent 1 with
agent 3. In the proof of the subsequent proposition we will show that
there exists the level of the marginal cost parameter of agent 3 in stage
1, which is the most preferred by agent 1, 013. This implies that there
exits also the corresponding most preferred knowledge level of agent 3,
013. This fact, however, doesnt automatically mean that in stage 0 there
is always knowledge disclosure of agent 1 to agent 3. We have already
discussed a similar issue when we talked about the knowledge disclosure
between agents 3 and 2. Applying the same reasoning as there, we dene
situations in which the knowledge disclosure occurs and when it doesnt.
This all is summarized in Proposition 7:
Proposition 7 If there exists a knowledge sharing SPE, then in such
an equilibrium
a) when 21  13 , in stage 0 agent 1 has no incentives to share his
knowledge with agent 3, that is
013 = 0:
b) when 21 <
1
3
agent 1 may have such incentives in stage 0 and they
are described by the following rule:
013 = 0; if (1  30) [ (013  30) ;
013 > 0; otherwise.
It follows from Proposition 7 that in a potential equilibrium agent 1
the stronger active player of stage 1 of a game, may have sometimes
incentives to share his knowledge with agent 3 the passive player of that
stage. To understand the mechanism that leads to knowledge sharing in
this case we need to consider possible e¤ects that may play a role here.
Note that passing a piece of knowledge by agent 1 to agent 3 makes the
latter one stronger than before, which results in lowering the valuations
i;1 in stage 1 of a game for both agents, 1 and 2 (see eq.(15)). This
a¤ects the performance of those players in stage 1 of a game, by reducing
their e¤ort levels. However, this detrimental e¤ect for the performance of
agent 2 in stage 1 of a game is much stronger than for agent 1, as a result
of the di¤erence in their marginal cost of e¤ort. As Proposition 7 shows
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this di¤erence must be big enough, as reected by the restriction on the
knowledge level of agent 2, which needs to be low enough in comparison
to agent 1. As in our CSF relative and not absolute e¤ort levels play a
role in the determination of winning probabilities, as a consequence the
probability of winning by agent 1 in stage 1 increases and by agent 2
falls. So it may happen that for agent 1 the gain in terms of the winning
probability in stage 1 of a game outweighs the negative e¤ect of the
reduction in his valuation 1;1 in stage 1, which creates incentives for
him to share knowledge with agent 3.
Note that by Proposition 6 agent 2 has no incentives to share knowl-
edge with agent 3. It follows that the level of the marginal cost of e¤ort
of agent 3 can be a¤ected only by agent 1, as dened in Proposition 7.
Now, we can summarize all our previous results in the form of the
following proposition:
Proposition 8 There exists a unique knowledge sharing SPE dened in
the following way:
1. there is no knowledge disclosure in stage 1 of a game between the
players in stage 2, if all participants of that stage have already been
determined, that is
113 = 
1
31 = 
1
23 = 
1
32 = 0;
2. there is no knowledge disclosure in stage 0 of a game between the
active players in stage 1, that is
012 = 
0
21;
3. there is no knowledge disclosure in stage 0 of a game from the
weaker player in stage 1 to the passive player in that stage, that is
023 = 0;
4. there is no knowledge disclosure in stage 0 of a game from the
passive player in stage 1 to the stronger player in that stage, that
is
031 = 0;
5. when 21  13 , then in stage 0 of a game there is no knowledge
disclosure from the stronger player in stage 1 to the passive player
in that stage, that is
013 = 0;
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6. when 21 <
1
3
, then in stage 0 of a game the knowledge disclosure
may occur from the stronger player in stage 1 to the passive player
in that stage, according to the following rule
013 = 0; if (1  30) [ (013  30) ;
013 > 0; otherwise,
7. the knowledge disclosure may occur in stage 0 of a game from the
passive player in stage 1 to the weaker player in that stage, accord-
ing to the following rule
032 = 0; if (30  20) [ (032  20) ;
032 > 0; otherwise.
Proposition 8 is a summary of all our results obtained earlier. It
shows that there exists a unique knowledge sharing SPE in which some
agents have incentive to share their knowledge with their rivals. An
important property of this equilibrium is that those incentives arise al-
though agents behave non-cooperatively. Their common feature is that
sharing of knowledge works here as an instrument to sabotage indirectly
potential rivals. For instance, in stage 0 of a game agent 3 is willing to
share knowledge with agent 2 the weaker player in stage 1 of a game,
because in this way he may try to eliminate from stage 2 agent 1 the
stronger rival. In a similar way, in stage 0 agent 1 is willing to share
knowledge with agent 3, because in this way by reducing the relative
performance of agent 2 can increase his own probability of winning in
stage 1 of a game. A similar mechanism of sabotaging we can nd in
Amegashie and Runkel (2007). The authors study a two-stage elimi-
nation contest, where agents can perform sabotage activity only in the
rst stage. They show that indirect sabotage may appear in the form of
help to a weaker player to decrease winning chances of a stronger player.
This is very similar to what we observe in our model, where any potential
knowledge sharing with one player, which can be interpreted as a form
of helping him, acts as an instrument to eliminate another player. How-
ever, there exist fundamental di¤erence between the work of Amegashie
and Runkel (2007) and ours. In their paper the relative performance of
a player who received help is enhanced only in the stage of a game in
which the sabotaging activity is performed. In our work, however, the
e¤ect of knowledge sharing (help) enhances the relative performance of
a help receiver throughout the whole game in any potential ght and at
any of its stages.
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3.4 Numerical example
To understand better di¤erent forces that govern the knowledge-sharing
behavior of agents and to illustrate how they work in practice we simu-
lated the equilibrium numerically. In this section we present the results
of this analysis. By Proposition 4 in all our calculations we set the value
of a parameter 11 equal to its ex ante value 10 = 1. In terms of para-
meters 20 and 30 we considered di¤erent combinations of their values
that are admissible in our model, that is ones that satisfy 20 > 10 = 1
and 30 > 09. Note that by Proposition 8 in equilibrium a parameter 
1
ij
is always zero for all pairs fi; jg ; i; j 2 N2; i 6= j. Moreover, by the same
proposition, a parameter 0ij is zero for all pairs fi; jg ; i; j 2 N; i 6= j
except for f1; 3g and f3; 2g, where it may be strictly positive. There-
fore, in our analysis we concentrate on those two parameters only. We
report our results on the equilibrium values of 013 and 
0
32 in Tables 1
to 6. Tables 1 and 2 present the equilibrium values of the parameters
in their nominal levels, Tables 3 and 4 present them as a percentage of
the di¤erence between the knowledge levels of an knowledge donor and
a receiver, and nally Tables 5 and 6 as a percentage of the knowledge
level of a knowledge donor.
Our analysis reveals that there are no interior equilibria, where both
013 and 
0
32 are strictly positive at the same time. It is also worth to notice
that the knowledge sharing between agents 1 and 3 can be observed only
at high levels of the parameter 30, and that knowledge sharing between
agents 3 and 2 appears even at its low levels. Comparing Tables 1 and
2, we see that the amount of knowledge shared between agents 3 and
2 in nominal terms is much bigger that between agents 1 and 3. This
observation holds also in relative terms (Tables 3 to 6). If we go some
more into detail by considering the parameter 032 and Tables 1, 3 and 5
we will easily notice that knowledge sharing never occurs in equilibrium
if 30 > 20. In such a case the knowledge level of agent 3 is lower than
the knowledge level of agent 2 and knowledge sharing is not possible by
assumption. We may also notice that given 30 the amount of knowledge
shared in equilibrium by agent 3 with agent 2 increases monotonically in
20. It means that the lower is the knowledge level of agent 2, the more
knowledge he receives from agent 3. This conclusion holds independently
of whether we measure the level of knowledge sharing in nominal (Table
9In our numerical analysis we used 20 ={1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} and 30 ={0.25, 0.5, 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2, 2.25,
2.5, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600,
700, 800, 900, 1000}. Note also that as our previous considerations suggest as
long as a parameter V > 0, it doesnt a¤ect potential maxima of the marginal cost
parameters. Therefore our numerical analysis didnt require to dene it explicitly.
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1) or in relative terms (Tables 3 and 5). This is somehow di¤erent if
we study the amount of knowledge shared by agent 3 given 20. In
such a case it decreases monotonically in 30 in nominal terms, but
increases monotonically as a percentage of the di¤erence between the
knowledge levels of agent 2 and agent 3 (Table 3) or even increases rst
and decreases afterwards as a percentage of the knowledge level of agent
3 (Table 5). This means in nominal terms that the more knowledge
agent 3 has, the more knowledge he is ready to disclose to agent 2.
Moreover, although the amount of the knowledge shared in nominal
terms decreases in 30, at the same time  as the results in Table 3
suggest this amount is more and more capable to cover the di¤erence
between the knowledge levels of agent 2 and agent 3. As a consequence,
for some combinations of the parameters 20 and 30, this di¤erence is
covered completely and disappears in equilibrium, so that both agents
have then the same level of the marginal cost of e¤ort. If we consider the
parameter 013 and Tables 2, 4 and 6, we may notice that given 30 the
amount of the knowledge shared in equilibrium by agent 1 with agent 3
increases in 20 rst and decreases afterwards, suggesting the existence
of some maximum. Moreover, this knowledge sharing never occurs in
equilibrium if 20  3, as our analytical solution suggested. However, if
we study the amount of knowledge shared by agent 1 with agent 3 given
20, then this always monotonically increases in 30 with the property
that this knowledge sharing never occurs in equilibrium if 30  30. It
means that agent 3 has to be very weak in comparison with agent 1,
so that the latter one has incentives to disclose some of his knowledge
to the former one. It means also that if knowledge sharing takes place
(013 > 0), then the more knowledge agent 3 possesses the less knowledge
he receives from agent 1. All these conclusions hold independently of
whether we measure the level of knowledge sharing in nominal (Table 2)
or in relative terms (Tables 4 and 6).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we study a model where non-cooperatively behaving agents
may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential
factor that could induce the disclosure of knowledge between humans
we consider the timing of the moves of players. To concentrate only on
incentives to share knowledge, we develop a simple model of a multistage
game, in which there are only three players and competition takes place
only within two stages. In the rst stage, two of three agents compete
against each other and the winner goes to the second stage of the game.
Here he competes with the third agent, who in the previous stage was not
active. An important feature of our model is that players can share their
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private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled
as inuencing marginal cost of e¤ort of players. This is done in such
a way that more knowledge is associated with lower levels of marginal
cost. Before the whole game starts, all agents decide to pass or not some
of their private knowledge to each of their opponents, which a¤ects their
cost functions that they use in subsequent stages. Such a decision is
taken again at the end of the rst stage of a game by a survivor of that
stage and the agent who was not active in that stage.
One of our main results is that knowledge sharing can occur even
in purely non-cooperative environments. In particular, we managed to
show that there is only one agent, who never has incentives to share
his knowledge with opponents. This is the weaker participant of the
rst stage of a game. However, the stronger participant of that stage
may have incentives to disclose his knowledge before the whole game
starts to the "observer", if both the weaker agent and the "observer"
are weak enough. In such a case the stronger agent benets from de-
creasing the valuation of the prize of the weaker player. Our numerical
example reveals that in such a case the "observer" has to be very weak
ex ante in comparison with the stronger player, so that the latter one
has incentives to disclose some of his knowledge to the former one. It
also shows that the more knowledge the "observer" possesses the less
knowledge he receives from the stronger player. In our analysis we also
proved that the "observer" has incentives to share knowledge before the
actual competition in the rst stage with the weaker opponent of that
stage. This happens when the di¤erence in marginal cost of e¤ort be-
tween the weaker and the stronger player of the rst stage of a game
is high enough. In such a situation the "observer" gains by sharing his
knowledge to some extent with the weaker opponent, because in this
way, by increasing the probability of winning of the weaker opponent
in the ght in the rst stage, reduces the probability of winning of the
stronger one. Thus, through this mechanism, in the second stage the
"observer" has greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than
the stronger one. Our numerical example reveals that in such a case the
lower is the knowledge level of the weaker player, the more knowledge
he receives from the "observer". It also shows that the more knowledge
the "observer" has the more knowledge he is ready to disclose to the
weaker player. We show also that there is never exchange of knowledge
between the active participants of the rst stage of a game the weaker
and the stronger player, and also between participants of the nal stage
a survivor of the rst stage of a game and the "observer".
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. 10To prove the proposition we will consider
players i and j; i; j 2 N2; i 6= j, who participate in stage 2 of a game.
W.l.o.g we assume that j1  i1 (or equivalently i1  j1). We will
consider now an agent i and two cases:
a) j1 < i1 (or equivalently i1 < j1)
In such a case for an agent i it is always "technically" possible to
disclose some of his knowledge to an agent j. We will show now that
in spite of that fact, he never wants to do it. For that end we will use
the (sub)equilibrium expected payo¤ of an agent i in stage 2 given in
eq. (14). Proving that 1ij = 0 requires to show that for any admissible
values of parameters i2; j2 and V the inequality
@ui (i2; j2)
@j2
> 0
is satised. This inequality reects the fact that the decrease in the
value of j2 is never protable for an agent i, as this results in the fall
in his expected utility. Therefore, an agent i doesnt want to reduce j2.
By eq. (6), eq. (5) and eq. (3), any knowledge transmission (sij > 0)
reduces marginal cost of e¤ort of a knowledge receiver. It follows that
an agent i has no incentives to disclose any piece of his knowledge to an
agent j and that 1ij = 0.
By di¤erentiating eq. (14) w.r.t. j2 we obtain that
@ui (i2; j2)
@j2
=
2i2j2
(i2 + j2)
3V:
It is obvious that this is always strictly positive, given our assumption
on strictly positive values of the parameters. This proves that 1ij = 0
for all i; j 2 N2; i 6= j, whenever j1 < i1.
10All the proofs in this section were done with help of Mathematica (Wolfram
Research).
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b) j1 = i1 (or equivalently i1 = j1)
Note that in this case for an agent i it is always "technically" im-
possible to disclose some of his knowledge to an agent j. So by eq. (4)
1ij = 0, whenever j1 = i1.
So it follows from our discussion that an agent i never has incentives
to disclose some of his knowledge to an agent j, and 1ij = 0.
Consider now an agent j. Note that when j1  i1, then for an agent
j it is always "technically" impossible to disclose some of his knowledge
to an agent i. So by eq. (4) 1ji = 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the rst part of the proposition,
that 012 = 0, note rst that by assumption 20 > 10. This by eq.
(3) means that 20 < 10. Hence, for agent 1 it is always "technically"
possible to disclose some of his knowledge to agent 2. We will show
now that in spite of that fact, he never wants to do it. For that end we
will use the (sub)equilibrium expected payo¤s of agents 1 and 2 at the
beginning of stage 1 given in eq. (20). Setting i = 1 and j = 2, this
equation becomes
u1 (11; 21; 31) =
(2131)
2 (21 + 31)
4
(11 + 31)
2  11 (11 + 31)2 + 21 (21 + 31)22V .
(23)
Proving that 112 = 0 requires to show that for any admissible values of
parameters 11; 21; 31 and V the inequality
@u1 (11; 21; 31)
@21
> 0
is satised. This inequality reects the fact that the decrease in the
value of 21 is never protable for agent 1, as this results in the fall
in his expected utility. Therefore, agent 1 doesnt want to reduce 21.
By eq. (6), eq. (5) and eq. (3), any knowledge transmission (sij > 0)
reduces marginal cost of e¤ort of a knowledge receiver. It follows that
agent 1 has no incentives to disclose any piece of his knowledge to agent
2 in stage 0 of a game and that 112 = 0.
By di¤erentiating eq. (23) w.r.t. 21 we obtain that
@u1 (11; 21; 31)
@21
=
21121
2
31 (321 + 31) (21 + 31)
3 
11 (11 + 31)
2 + 21 (21 + 31)
23V:
It is obvious that this is always strictly positive, given our assumption
on strictly positive values of the parameters. Note that this result holds
for all admissible values of 21, and in particular for 21 = 20. This
completes the rst part of the proof.
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Proving the second part of the proposition, that 121 = 0, is straight-
forward. As we noted earlier 20 < 10, so by eq. (4) 
1
21 = 0. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. Using similar reasoning as in the proof of Propo-
sition 2, to prove the lemma we need to show that for any admissible
values of parameters 11; 21; 31 and V with 11 < 21 the inequality
@u3 (11; 21; 31)
@11
> 0
holds. This inequality reects the fact that the decrease in the value
of 11 is never protable for agent 3, as this results in the fall in his
expected utility. Therefore, agent 3 doesnt want to reduce 11. By eq.
(6), eq. (5) and eq. (3), any knowledge transmission (sij > 0) reduces
marginal cost of e¤ort of a knowledge receiver. It follows that in stage 0
agent 3 has no incentives to disclose any piece of his knowledge to agent
1 and that 031 = 0.
Di¤erentiating eq. (22) w.r.t. 11 yields
@u3 (11; 21; 31)
@11
=
2131N (11)
(11 + 31)
3  11 (11 + 31)2 + 21 (21 + 31)22V
(24)
where
N (11)= 3 (221 + 31)511 +
 
8221   102131   5231

411
   31  231 + 22131   21221311
+
 
231
 
231 + 22131 + 19
2
21

211
+
 
21
 
2421 + 8
3
2131 + 12
2
21
2
31 + 1521
3
31 + 2
4
31

11
+221
4
31:
Using the assumptions about the values of the parameters we obtain
after some algebra that the values produced by eq. (24) are always
strictly positive, which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove the part (i) of the lemma, we need
to show that for 11 = 1 and any strictly positive value of parameters
21; 31 and V there exists 032 that satises the following relation
@u3 (1; 
0
21; 31)
@21
= 0,
and that this value 032 is the global maximum. Di¤erentiating eq. (22)
w.r.t. 21 produces
@u3 (11; 21; 31)
@21
=
1131O (21)
(21 + 31)
3  11 (11 + 31)2 + 21 (21 + 31)22V
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where
O (21)= 3 (211 + 31)521 +
 
8211   101131   5231

421 (25)
   31  231 + 21131   21211321
+
 
231
 
231 + 21131 + 19
2
11

221
+
 
11
 
2411 + 8
3
1131 + 12
2
11
2
31 + 1511
3
31 + 2
4
31

21
+211
4
31:
After equating it to zero, setting 11 = 1 and solving for 21 we get a
maximum candidate
032 =

O (21; 3) ; if31 < 7:94211;
O (21; 5) ; if31  7:94211; (26)
where O(21; n) denotes the n-th root of the polynomial O(21) dened
for 11 = 1:
O (21)= 3 (31 + 2)521  
 
5231 + 1031   8

421
   31  231 + 231   21321
+
 
231
 
231 + 231 + 19

221
+
 
2431+15
3
31+12
2
31 + 831 + 2

21 + 
4
31:
For 032 to be the global maximum we need to show that
@u3(1;21;31)
@21
is a
strictly quasi-concave function of 21. As our problem is unidimensional,
this requires to show that for any strictly positive values of parameters
21; 31 and V the inequalities
@u3 (1; 21; 31)
@21
> 0, if 21 < 032;
and
@u3 (1; 21; 31)
@21
< 0, if 21 > 032
hold. After examination of the properties of @u

3(1;21;31)
@21
it turns out
that the two last inequalities are always satised, which implies that
there exist the global maximum given by eq. (26).
It follows that if 11 = 10 = 1, then there exists the level of the
marginal cost parameter of agent 2 in stage 1, which is the most preferred
by agent 3, 032, given by the following relation
032 =

O (21; 3) ; if31 < 7:94211;
O (21; 5) ; if31  7:94211; (27)
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where O(21; n) denotes the n-th root of the polynomial
O (21)= 3 (31 + 2)521  
 
5231 + 1031   8

421
   31  231 + 231   21321 +  231  231 + 231 + 19221
+
 
2431+15
3
31+12
2
31 + 831 + 2

21 + 
4
31;
This proves the part (i) of the lemma.
To prove its part (ii), we need to show that for any strictly positive
value of a parameter 31 the relation
032 > 1
is always true. In particular this requires to check whether the two
following inequalities
O (21; 3) > 10 = 1; if 31 < 7:94211;
and
O (21; 5) > 10 = 1; if 31  7:94211;
hold for any strictly positive value of 31. It turns out after examination
that they are always satised, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 2 neither agent 1 nor agent
2 will share their knowledge between themselves in stage 0 of a game, so
in that stage the only potential source of knowledge ow towards agent
1 or 2 that could change their marginal cost parameters is agent 3. By
2, if 11 = 10 = 1, then the level of the marginal cost parameter of
agent 2 in stage 1, which is the most preferred by agent 3, 032, is always
greater than 10 = 1, hence 10 < 032. In such a case it always holds
that 11 < 21 in a potential equilibrium, so by Lemma 1 in stage 0 of
a game agent 3 has no incentives to share his knowledge with agent 1,
that is 031 = 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. We know that 10 = 1 < 20 by assumption.
By Proposition 2 in stage 0 of a game neither agent 1 nor agent 2 will
share their knowledge between themselves, so in that stage the only
potential source of knowledge ow towards agent 1 or 2 that could change
their marginal cost parameters is agent 3. Moreover, by Proposition 3 in
stage 0 of a game agent 3 has no incentive to share his knowledge with
agent 1. It follows that in a potential equilibrium in that stage none of
the opponents will share knowledge with agent 1, which implies that his
marginal cost of e¤ort in stage 1 remains at his ex ante level 10 = 1,
and 11 = 10 = 1. Moreover, by Lemma 2 if 11 = 10 = 1, then the
level of the marginal cost parameter of agent 2 in stage 1, which is the
most preferred by agent 3, 032, is always greater than 10 = 1. So it
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follows from our reasoning that 21 = 
0
32 > 10 = 

11, which completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. By Proposition 4, in a potential equilibrium
always 11 = 10 = 1. Then by Lemma 2, there exists the level of the
marginal cost parameter of agent 2 in stage 1 which is the most preferred
by agent 3, 032, dened in eq. (27), with the corresponding knowledge
level
032 =
1
032
: (28)
It follows that in stage 0 of a game agent 3may have sometimes incentives
to pass a piece of his knowledge to agent 2. By sharing his knowledge
agent 3 may try to modify the level of the marginal cost of e¤ort of agent
2 in stage 1, so that it maximizes his own expected utility. In order to
derive specic values of a parameter 032, we need to consider four cases:
a) 30  20
In such a situation, agent 3 has a lower (or equal) level of knowledge
ex ante than agent 2, which using eq. (4) implies that 032 = 0.
b) 032  20
In such a situation, the level of the knowledge of agent 2 in stage 1,
which is the most preferred by agent 3, is below (or equal to) the knowl-
edge level ex ante of agent 2. In our model, any knowledge transmission
(sij > 0) is always benecial to a knowledge receiver, as it increases his
knowledge (and never reduces it). Therefore in stage 0 of a game agent
3 prefers not to disclose any piece of his knowledge to agent 2, which
implies that 032 = 0.
c) (30 > 20) \ (30 > 032 > 20)
30 > 20, so in such a case for agent 3 it is "technically" possible
to pass some of his knowledge to agent 2. Moreover 30 > 032 > 20,
so the level of the knowledge of agent 2 in stage 1, which is the most
preferred by agent 3, is above the knowledge level ex ante of agent 2 and
below the knowledge level ex ante of agent 3. This creates in stage 0 of
a game incentives for agent 3 to disclose some of his knowledge to agent
2. Therefore, agent 3 has both: incentives and possibility to disclose
some of his knowledge to agent 2. The knowledge is disclosed in such
a way that the resulting level of the knowledge of agent 2 in stage 1 is
equal to 12 = 032. This requires that agent 3 passes to agent 2 a piece
of knowledge equal to 032 = 
0
32   20.
d) (30 > 20) \ (032  30)
As in the previous case 30 > 20, so in this case for agent 3 it is
still "technically" possible to pass some of his knowledge to agent 2.
Moreover 032  30, so the level of the knowledge of agent 2 in stage
1, which is the most preferred by agent 3, is above or equal to the
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knowledge level ex ante of agent 3 (and by the previous inequality also
above the knowledge level ex ante of agent 2). This creates in stage 0 of
a game incentives for agent 3 to disclose some of his knowledge to agent
2. Therefore, as in the previous case, agent 3 has both: incentives and
possibility to disclose some of his knowledge to agent 2. Recall, however,
that by the mechanism of the knowledge transmission that we assume in
this paper, a resulting knowledge level of a knowledge receiver cannot be
higher than a knowledge level of a knowledge donor. It follows that in
our current case the knowledge is disclosed in stage 0 of a game in such a
way that the resulting level of the knowledge of agent 2 in stage 1 is the
same as the level ex ante of the knowledge of agent 3, that is 12 = 30.
This requires that agent 3 passes to agent 2 a piece of knowledge equal
to 032 = 30   20.
Summarizing all the results obtained in the four cases we obtain:
032 =
8<:
0; if (30  20) [ (032  20) ;
032   20; if (30 > 20) \ (30 > 032 > 20) ;
30   20; if (30 > 20) \ (032  30) ;
If we focus only on the instances in which the knowledge disclosure occurs
and in which it doesnt, we can simplify the last expression and rewrite
it as: 
032 = 0; if (30  20) [ (032  20) ;
032 > 0; otherwise.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. By di¤erentiating eq. (20) w.r.t. 31 we
obtain that for all i 2 N1; i 6= j
@ui (i1; j1; 31)
@31
=
2i1
2
j131 (j1 + 31)
3M (31)
(i1 + 31)
3  i1 (i1 + 31)2 + j1 (j1 + 31)23V;
(29)
where
M (31)= (3i1   j1)331 + 3
 
22i1   i1j1 + 2j1

231
+3
 
3i1 + 
3
j1

31 + j1
 
3i1 + 
3
j1

:
Setting i = 2 and j = 1, eq. (29) becomes
@u2 (21; 11; 31)
@31
=
22112131 (11 + 31)
3M (31)
(21 + 31)
3  11 (11 + 31)2 + 21 (21 + 31)23V;
(30)
with
M (31)= (321   11)331 + 3
 
211   1121 + 2221

231
+3
 
311 + 
3
21

31 + 11
 
311 + 
3
21

:
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Using similar reasoning as in our previous proofs, to prove the propo-
sition it is enough to show that for any admissible values of parameters
11; 21; 31 and V the inequality
@u2 (21; 11; 31)
@31
> 0 (31)
is satised. In such a case the decrease in the value of 31 is never
protable for agent 2, as this results in the fall in his expected utility.
Therefore, agent 2 doesnt want to reduce 31. By eq. (6), eq. (5) and
eq. (3), any knowledge transmission (sij > 0) reduces marginal cost of
e¤ort of a knowledge receiver. It follows that agent 2 has no incentives
to disclose any piece of his knowledge to agent 3 in stage 0 of a game
and that 023 = 0.
Note, that by our assumption on the parameters, the denominator
of eq. (30) is always strictly positive, and the sign of the nominator de-
pends only on the sign of values produced byM (31). Therefore we will
concentrate only on studying the polynomial M (31). By Proposition
4 in equilibrium 11 < 21. Using this fact it is easy to notice that two
rst coe¢ cients of the polynomial satisfy respectively
321   11 > 0
and
3
 
211   1121 + 2221

= 3
 
21 (11 + 21) + (21   11)2

> 0;
and the last two are always strictly positive. Hence all coe¢ cients of
the polynomial M (31) are strictly positive. Therefore, given our as-
sumption on strictly positive values of the parameters, M (31) is al-
ways strictly positive, which implies that the inequality (31) is always
satised. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. Setting i = 1; j = 2 and considering the
fact that by Proposition 4 11 = 10 = 1, eq. (29) becomes
@u1 (1; 21; 31)
@31
=
222131 (21 + 31)
3M (31)
(1 + 31)
3  (1 + 31)2 + 21 (21 + 31)23V; (32)
with
M (31)= (3  21)331 + 3
 
2  21 + 221

231
+3
 
1 + 321

31 + 21
 
1 + 321

:
We will prove the proposition considering two cases: of 21  3 and
of 21 > 3.
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Consider rst the case of 21  3. Applying similar reasoning as in
our previous proofs, we will show now that for 21  3 and any strictly
positive values of parameters 31 and V the inequality
@u1 (1; 21; 31)
@31
> 0, (33)
is always satised. In such a case the decrease in the value of 31 is never
protable for agent 1, as this results in the fall in his expected utility.
Therefore, agent 1 doesnt want to reduce 31. By eq. (6), eq. (5) and
eq. (3), any knowledge transmission (sij > 0) reduces marginal cost of
e¤ort of a knowledge receiver. It follows that if 21  3, then agent 1
has no incentives to disclose any piece of his knowledge to agent 3 in
stage 0 of a game and that 113 = 0.
Note, that by our assumption on the parameters, the denominator
of eq. (32) is always strictly positive, and the sign of the nominator
depends only on the sign of values produced by M (31). Therefore we
concentrate only on studying the polynomialM (31). It is easy to notice
that if 21  3, then its two rst coe¢ cients satisfy respectively
3  21  0
and
3
 
2  21 + 221

= 3
 
1 + 21 + (1  21)2

> 0;
and the last two are always strictly positive. Hence all coe¢ cients of the
polynomial M (31) are strictly positive or equal to zero, with the last
term being always strictly positive. Therefore if 21  3, then M (31)
is always strictly positive, given our assumption on strictly positive val-
ues of the parameters. This implies that the inequality (33) is always
satised.
Consider now the second case of 21 > 3. We will demonstrate now
that for 21 > 3 and any strictly positive values of parameters 31 and
V there exists 013 that satises the following relation
@u1 (1; 21; 
0
31)
@31
= 0,
and that this value 013 is the global maximum. We will also prove that
this global maximum is always higher than 10 = 1. After equating the
expression (32) to zero and solving for 31 we get a maximum candidate
013 =M (31;1) : (34)
It can be veried that the value produced by this root is always strictly
positive. For 013 to be the global maximum we need to show that
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@u1(1;21;031)
@31
is a strictly quasi-concave function of 31. As our prob-
lem is unidimensional, this requires to show that for 21 > 3 and any
strictly positive values of parameters 31 and V the inequalities
@u1 (1; 21; 31)
@31
> 0, if 31 < 013;
and
@u1 (1; 21; 31)
@31
< 0, if 31 > 013
hold. After examination of properties of
@u1(1;21;031)
@31
it turns out that
the two last inequalities are always satised, which implies that there
exist the global maximum given by eq. (34). To prove that this global
maximum is always higher than 10 = 1, we need to verify whether the
following relation
013 > 10 = 1
holds for all 21 > 3. It turns out after examination that this is in fact
true.
Now, using results on 013 we will derive the values of the parameter
113 for 21 > 3. As our previous analysis for 21 > 3 reveals, there
exists the most preferred by agent 1 level of the marginal cost parameter
of agent 3 in stage 1, 013, dened in eq. (34) with the corresponding
knowledge level
013 =
1
013
: (35)
It follows that agent 1 may have sometimes incentives in stage 0 to pass
a piece of his knowledge to agent 3. Specically, by sharing knowledge
agent 1 may try to modify the level of the marginal cost of e¤ort of
agent 3 in stage 1, so that it maximizes his expected utility. However, as
the analysis in the previous paragraph shows, in stage 0 agent 1 never
has incentives to reduce the level of the marginal cost of e¤ort of agent
3 to the level which is below or equal to his own level of the marginal
cost of e¤ort. In other words, agent 1 never has incentives in stage 0 to
increase the knowledge level of agent 3 in stage 1 to the level which is
above or equal to his own knowledge level ex ante. In order to derive
specic values of a parameter 013, we need to consider here three cases:
a) (1 = 10  30)
In such a situation, agent 1 has a lower (or equal) level of knowledge
ex ante than agent 3, which using eq. (4) implies that 013 = 0.
b) (013  30)
In such a situation, the level of the knowledge of agent 3 in stage 1,
which is the most preferred by agent 1, is below (or equal to) the knowl-
edge level ex ante of agent 3. In our model, any knowledge transmission
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(sij > 0) is always benecial to a knowledge receiver, as it increases his
knowledge (and never reduces it). Therefore in stage 0 agent 1 prefers
not to disclose any piece of his knowledge to agent 3, which implies that
013 = 0.
c) (1 = 10 > 30) \ (1 = 10 > 013 > 30)
10 > 30, so in such a case for agent 1 it is "technically" possible to
pass some of his knowledge to agent 3. Moreover 10 > 013 > 30, so the
level of the knowledge of agent 3 in stage 1, which is the most preferred
by agent 1, is above the knowledge level ex ante of agent 3 and below the
knowledge level ex ante of agent 1. This creates in stage 0 incentives for
agent 1 to disclose some of his knowledge to agent 3. Therefore, agent
1 has both: incentives and possibility to disclose some of his knowledge
to agent 3. The knowledge is disclosed in such a way that the resulting
level of the knowledge of agent 3 in stage 1 is equal to 13 = 013. This
requires that agent 1 passes to agent 3 a piece of knowledge equal to
013 = 
0
13   30.
Summarizing all the results obtained in the three cases for 21 > 3
we obtain:
013 =

0; if (1  30) [ (013  30) ;
013   30; if (1 > 30) \ (1 > 013 > 30) :
If we summarize all our results about 013 for 21  3 (21  13) and
21 > 3 (21 < 13) we get
013 =

0; if
 
21  13
 [   21 < 13 \ ((1  30) [ (013  30)) ;
013   30; if
 
21 <
1
3
 \ ((1 > 30) \ (1 > 013 > 30)) :
If we focus only on the instances in which the knowledge disclosure
occurs and in which it doesnt, we can simplify the last expression and
rewrite it as:
013 = 0;
if 21  13 , and 
013 = 0; if (1  30) [ (013  30) ;
013 > 0; otherwise,
if 21 < 13 . This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8. By Propositions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 all best
reply functions exist and are uniquely dened over their domains, which
implies the existence of a unique equilibrium.
By Proposition 1
113 = 
1
31 = 
1
23 = 
1
32 = 0;
35
which is exactly the rst expression in the statement of the proposition.
By Proposition 2
012 = 
0
21 = 0;
which is the second expression in the statement of the proposition.
By Proposition 6
023 = 0;
which is the third expression in the statement of the proposition.
By Proposition 3
031 = 0;
which is the fourth expression in the statement of the proposition.
By Proposition 7, if 21  13 ;
013 = 0;
and if 21 <
1
3 
013 = 0; if (1  30) [ (013  30) ;
013 > 0; if otherwise,
where 013 is dened in eq. (35). These are the fth and sixth expression
of the proposition.
The last expression of the proposition follows from Proposition 5.
Using it we obtain that
032 = 0; if (30  20) [ (032  20) ;
032 > 0; if otherwise,
where 032 is dened in eq. (28). This completes the proof.
Tables
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